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1 Introduction
In Bangladesh, poverty, hunger, and malnutrition are
widespread and the struggle to achieve food security
is ever present for tens of millions of people. About
half of the population is still too poor to afford
enough food to sustain a healthy and productive life.
Nonetheless, the country has made substantial
progress since the mid-1970s in enhancing food
security and reducing vulnerability to disasters by
increasing production of rice and wheat, improving
its infrastructure, making food delivery to the poor
more efficient and liberalising its markets.
In 1998, Bangladesh was devastated by the worst
flood of the century. At its peak in early September
1998, the flooding covered two-thirds of the
country, causing severe damage to the major rice
crop (a total of 2.2 million tons of rice crop losses,
equal to 10.45 per cent of target production in
1998/9) and threatening the food security of tens of
millions of households.
In spite of the damage to the rice harvest and major
disruption of the rural economy and employment
opportunities, no famine or major food crisis
occurred. There were very few flood-related
deaths, and reportedly none occurred due to food
shortages. Poor households did suffer substantial
hardship during and after the floods, but the
combination of well-functioning private markets
and government, donor and NGO interventions to
a large extent maintained availability of and access
to food. Overall, though, the success in handling
the effects of the 1998 flood stands in sharp
contrast to the famine caused by the flood in 1974,
which contributed to tens of thousands of deaths.
This article summarises the results of several
research reports and other publications in
describing how the 1998 flood affected food
security in Bangladesh at the national and
household levels, the response of the government
to the crisis, and the coping strategies employed by
the households themselves.1 It then highlights
policy lessons for the management and reduction
of the adverse impact of future natural disasters.
The analysis summarised in this article is based on
secondary data on market prices, imports and
production, along with primary data from a multi-
round survey of 757 households in seven flood-IDS Bulletin Vol 33 No 4 2002
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affected thanas, conducted in December 1998
(about 2.5 months after the floodwaters had
receded), April–May 1998, and December 1999.
2 Foodgrain markets and the
policy response in 1998
At the sectoral level, the Government of Bangladesh
and donor officials were keenly aware of the
potential flood damage to the main monsoon
season (aman) rice crop and threat to foodgrain
availability, even while the immediate relief
operations were underway. Thus, the Government
launched an appeal for international flood relief and
food aid in August 1998, anticipating that by the
time the floodwaters receded, it would be too late to
replant a large portion of the aman rice area. Donors
ultimately responded by delivering 1,233 million
tons of food aid in 1998/9, but from October
through December 1998, government distribution
of foodgrains was constrained by the lack of
available public stocks. Thus, public foodgrain
distribution from July to December 1998 was only
631 tons greater than planned before the flood.
Despite only a small increase above previously
scheduled supplies through government channels
in the last six months of 1998, markets were
stabilised by private sector imports of rice and
wheat. Inflows of 1.3 million tons of rice from
India during this period (and over 2.5 million tons
by June 1999)2 kept prices from rising above
import parity levels following the flood.
Evidence from letters of credit for rice imports shows
that large numbers of traders participated in the
(mostly overland) rice import trade, with an average
contract size of 269 tons in 1998. Thus, private
markets appear to have worked competitively to limit
the price increases to only 12.4 per cent from
May–July to August–December 1998. Moreover,
price variations were of a similar magnitude across
various regions of Bangladesh – further evidence of
well-functioning domestic markets.
3 A comparison with earlier
major production shortfalls
Clearly, private sector imports played a major role
in stabilising rice and wheat markets following the
1998 floods. Government policy in three earlier
periods of major foodgrain production shortfalls
caused by floods in 1974, 1984 and 1988
depended much more heavily on public sector
market interventions. In 1974, a large-scale famine,
resulting in between 30,000 and 100,000 deaths,
followed floods that damaged aus and aman rice
crops (normally harvested in July–August and
November–December, respectively).3 In contrast,
flood damage to the aus rice crop in 1984 and to
the aman rice crop at the end of 1988 caused sharp
declines in production, but no famines occurred.
3.1 The 1974 famine
The 1974 famine was characterised by a very sharp
rise in nominal (and real) rice prices following the
floods in July. As in 1998, the floodwaters were late
in receding, leading to expectations in the media and
the markets of large crop losses in the aman rice crop
due to be harvested in November–December. Rice
prices in August through November 1974 were on
average 58.2 per cent higher than in May through
July 1974. This sharp rise in prices had disastrous
consequences for poor households lacking the
entitlements to acquire enough of their staple
commodity.4 Ravallion (1990) argued that this large
increase in rice prices was a major cause of famine
deaths, as calorie consumption fell below survival
thresholds. In contrast to 1974, however, rice prices
rose by only 7.0 per cent in these months following
the floods in 1988/9 and by 12.4 per cent in 1998/9.5
This difference in market price behaviour is not
explained by the size of the production shortfall. As
shown in Table 1, in comparison to trend aman rice
production, the aman shortfalls in 1988 (18.1 per
cent) and 1998 (18.0 per cent) were much larger
than the 1974 aman shortfall (8.5 per cent). Instead,
speculative behaviour by traders appears to have
played a major role in the 1974 price increase.6 In
addition, traders appear to have believed (correctly)
that the government would be unable to intervene
effectively to stabilise market prices in the event of a
production shortfall, because of extremely low
public stocks at the time of the flood (only 27,000
tons at the end of July 1974),7 shortage of foreign
exchange reserves for commercial imports,8
extremely high world foodgrain prices, and delays in
US food aid deliveries.9 Because of the shortfall in
stocks, public distribution of foodgrain was severely
limited, particularly in rural areas.
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Table 1: Availability, stocks and market prices in major flood years in Bangladesh
Foodgrain production 1974/5 1984/5 1988/9 1998/9
Aman (million tons) 6.29 7.93 6.86 7.74
Below trend (%) -8.5 -0.1 -18.1 -18.0
Total rice shortfall (calendar year, million tons) -0.608 -0.641 -0.241 -0.701
Per capita production (kg/person)
Rice (calendar year) 149.1 144.9 136.6 138.8
Wheat (calendar year) 1.2 12.5 9.9 14.3
Total foodgrain (calendar year) 150.3 157.4 146.6 153.1
Total foodgrain (fiscal year) 149.5 164.2 155.1 171.7
Aus and aman share of production (%) 80.3% 73.3% 62.5% 47.0%
PFDS distribution (July–June)
Total rice (thousand tons) 131 399 690 530
Total wheat (thousand tons) 1,597 2,163 2,251 1,603
Targeted rice (thousand tons) 4 6 167 386
Targeted wheat (thousand tons) 157 905 1,259 1,488
PFDS distribution (Aug–Nov)
Total rice (thousand MT) 43 201 231 216
Total wheat (thousand MT) 616 891 700 223
Targeted rice (thousand MT) 2 0 83 172
Targeted wheat (thousand MT) 87 298 287 186
Foodgrain imports (July–June)
Private rice imports (thousand tons) 0 0 0 2,663
Public rice imports (thousand tons) 267 695 61 393
Private wheat imports (thousand tons) 0 0 0 805
Public wheat imports (thousand tons) 2,030 1,898 2,075 1,603
Per capita availability (fiscal year)
Rice (kg/person) 133.26 136.99 134.07 162.31
Wheat (kg/person) 21.76 33.32 29.19 30.46
Total foodgrain (kg/person) 155.03 170.31 163.26 192.77
National wholesale prices
Rice: average (May–July) 359 778 884 1237
Rice: average (August–November) 568 807 946 1390
Rice: percent changea 58.2% 3.7% 7.0% 12.4%
Wheat: average (May–July) 256 438 538 857
Wheat: average (August–November) 413 495 620 949
Wheat: percent changea 61.2% 12.8% 15.3% 10.7%
Public foodgrain closing stocks
End July stocks
Rice (thousand MT) 27 101 710 438
Wheat (thousand MT) 293 651 784 273
Total (thousand MT) 320 752 1494 711
3.2 The 1984 flood
The situation after the flood in 1984 was very
different. Although successive floods in the early
part of 1984 led to great fears of damage to the aus
crop (July–August) as well as expectations of
shortfall in the aman, the floodwaters receded much
earlier in 1984 than they did in 1974, eventually
easing concerns of large aman crop losses. Total
decline in rice production in calendar year 1984 of
641,000 tons was, nevertheless, 33,000 tons greater
than the decline in production in 1974.
Improvements in the government’s capacity to
monitor production and markets enabled it to take
early steps to dampen speculative pressures in 1984
by importing food (Clay 1985).10 Adequate foreign
exchange made commercial purchases possible and
food aid flows were not restricted. Total foodgrain
imports in 1984/5 reached 2.8 million tons, about
700,000 tons higher than that in 1983/4. (Food aid
was 1.49 million tons and 1.54 million tons
respectively in the two years.) Given these
substantial imports, public stocks were soon built
up and reached a level equal to more than four
times what was available in 1974. The average
public distribution of food during the crucial
months of July–September 1984 (758,000 tons),
was double the average distribution during these
months in the preceding three years. Total public
distribution of food during 1984/5 was 2.56 million
as against 1.7 million tons during 1974/5.11
3.3 The 1988 flood
The 1988 flood, like the flood that occurred ten
years later, caused severe damage to the aman rice
crop: production was only 7.7 million tons,
578,000 tons less than the December 1987 crop
and 18.1 per cent below trend. Total rice
production in the calendar year 1988 was only
241,000 tons below that of the previous calendar
year, because somewhat less serious floods reduced
total rice production in 1987 as well.
As in 1984, the government of Bangladesh
responded to the shortfall with increased distribution
of food, with rice distribution supplied almost
entirely from existing stocks rather than commercial
imports. Government foodgrain stocks averaged 1.2
million tons from August through November 1998;
rice stocks accounted for slightly more than half the
total, averaging 621,000 tons. Total distribution of
foodgrain in 1998/9 was 2.94 million tons, much of
this channelled through large-scale rationing
programmes that involved subsidised sales. These
sales channels were plagued with substantial
leakages, however, that eventually led to their
elimination in the early 1990s (Ahmed et al. 2000).
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Table 1 (continued)
Foodgrain production 1974/5 1984/5 1988/9 1998/9
Average (August–November)
Rice (thousand tons) 21 223 621 359
Wheat (thousand tons) 187 413 546 310
Total (thousand tons) 208 636 1167 669
Average (August–November)
Rice (kg/person) 0.3 2.3 5.8 2.8
Wheat (kg/person) 2.4 4.2 5.1 2.4
Total (kg/person) 2.7 6.5 10.9 5.3
Foreign exchange reserves (US$million) 175 545 863 1,744
Cost of rice imports/FE reservesb 1.22 0.29 0.07 0.10
Mid-year population (millions) 78.2 98 106.8 127
Source: del Ninno, Dorosh and Smith (2001), FPMU (2001). 
a Percentage change from May–July average to August–November average. 
b C+F price of rice times rice shortfall (calendar year) divided by foreign exchange reserves.
3.4 Implications for public stocks
Stocks in 1998/9 were significantly larger than in
1974/5 in the crucial August to November months:
669,000 tons, or 5.3 kg per person, twice the per
capita stocks of 1974/5, although only half those of
1988/9.12 Several factors suggest that the need for
public stocks to avert famines in Bangladesh has
considerably decreased since 1974, however. First,
the record 10.55 million tons boro harvest in
May/June 1999, only five to six months after the
failure of the aman crop, shortened the period of
uncertainty regarding domestic supply, increasing
foodgrain availability, raising farmer incomes and
reducing prices.13 Production of wheat, another
winter season crop, played a similar role in
increasing food supplies, increasing from only 1.2
kg per capita in 1974 to 12.5 and 14.3 kg per capita
in 1984 and 1998, respectively.
Second, as shown above, private sector imports have
added to domestic supplies and quickly stabilised
prices at import parity levels following aman crop
shortfalls in 1997/8 and 1998/9. Third, rice markets
in Bangladesh are now much better developed than
in 1988/9, and especially compared with 1974/5, so
shortages across regions within the country can be
more easily met by domestic private (and public)
grain flows. (Public sector imports, an alternative to
private sector imports, encountered serious problems
with tenders in 1998/9 and were not a significant
source of supply.) Fourth, foreign exchange
constraints, which so severely hampered government
efforts to procure rice in 1974, had been greatly eased
through increased export earnings and availability of
commercial and official credit. Finally, international
markets for rice and other grains have grown deeper
and more stable, so the risk of facing high
international prices has lessened.14
4 Losses of crops, assets and
earnings from employment
Despite success in stabilising markets, households
still suffered because of floods. Crop losses
(particularly rice crop losses) due to the flood were
substantial. Some 45.7 per cent of households
surveyed, which produced a crop in the previous 12
months, suffered crop losses averaging Taka 2,975,
equivalent to 29 per cent of their production.
For the 55 per cent of households that lost assets,
their average loss was Taka 6,936, equivalent to 16
per cent of the total value of their pre-flood assets.
In all, 47 per cent of households suffered damage or
loss to housing, with the average loss equal to Taka
5,675, or 59 per cent of pre-flood housing value.
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Table 2: Mean values of household variables for all households and those who were flood-exposed
and in the bottom 40 percentile
November 1998 April 1999 November 1999
Bottom 40% flood-exposed households
Per capita expenditure (Taka) 424 516 505
Share of expenditure on food (%) 72.62 80.02 78.86
Per capita daily calorie consumption (kcal) 1,602 2,230 2,193
Households having outstanding debts (%) 75.22 68.58 64.16
Debts as share of total monthly expenditure (%) 167.48 126.85 106.07
Level of malnutrition (% children stunted) 64.86 69.59 64.90
All households
Per capita expenditure (Taka) 751 683 677
Share of expenditure on food (%) 67.97 77.15 76.12
Per capita daily calorie consumption (kcal) 2249 2518 2526
Households having outstanding debts (%) 66.31 60.63 53.63
Debts as share of total monthly expenditure (%) 131.56 90.42 87.10
Level of malnutrition (% children stunted) 54.80 62.98 57.18
Source: FMRSP–IFPRI household survey 1998–99.
The rural economy suffered serious disruption from
the floods as well. Average monthly days of paid
work went down in the period of the flood, but
increased in the period after the flood to the same
level as 12 months before the flood for all workers
except daily labourers. Daily labourers were most
affected as their employment fell sharply from 19
days per month from July to October 1997, to only
11 days per month in the same months in 1998.
Similarly, wage earnings also declined during the
floods and had not recovered to 1997 levels by
October–November 1998. For daily labourers,
average monthly earnings in July–October 1998
were 46 per cent below those in the same months in
1997, and in October–November 1998 they were
still 18 per cent below the 1997 levels. This decline
in number of days worked and wage earnings
occurred in the context of a labour market with little
open unemployment. Thus, underemployment
increased as workers worked fewer days, but most
workers found at least some employment.
Within eight months of the flood, as agricultural
production and rural employment recovered,
household incomes rose substantially, for both
flood-exposed households as well as those not
directly exposed. The average monthly income of
all households in the sample was 45 per cent
higher in April 1999 than in November 1998 and
about 50 per cent higher in November 1999. The
income level of flood-exposed households also
increased, by 35 per cent between November 1998
and April 1999 and by 49 per cent between
November 1998 and November 1999. However,
the incomes of poor flood-exposed households did
not increase as much as the other households.
5 Consumption, health and
nutrition
In the first few months after the flood, borrowing
from the informal sector enabled households to
increase spending on key non-food items (health,
housing and fuel), while maintaining total
expenditures on food. Average per capita household
expenditures were actually higher in November
1998 (Taka 751) than in April 1999 (Taka 683) or
November 1999 (Taka 677) (Table 2).
However, because of higher prices of rice,
vegetables and many other foods in November
1998, actual calorie consumption in this period was
significantly less than in the two subsequent periods
(2,249 calories/person per day, compared with
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Table 3: Coping strategies, flood exposure and poverty in November 1998
Flood exposed
Bottom Middle Top All Not All house-
40% 40% 20% exposed holds
Monthly households expenditure (Tk) 2,414.3 3,973.9 7,720.6 4,063.6 3,843.5 4,000.5
Share of food expenditures (%) 72.4 69.5 62.2 67.4 68.4 67.7
Households in debt (%)a 68.2 58.9 62.6 63.5 53.5 60.6
Share of monthly expenditure (%)a 186.1 138.7 131.3 144.4 140.2 143.6
Household purchasing food on credit (%) 56.7 54.1 50.5 54.4 29.5 47.3
Share of monthly expenditure (%) 37.6 27.2 17.3 25.8 20.0 25.0
Households receiving government 60.7 54.1 32.7 52.6 33.6 47.2
transfers (%)
Share of monthly expenditure (%) 3.4 2.4 0.8 2.0 2.1 2.0
Households selling assets (%) 25.2 21.3 15.9 21.9 20.3 21.4
Share of monthly expenditure (%) 45.5 51.3 75.3 51.9 44.2 49.9
Number of households 226 207 107 540 217 757
Source: del Ninno, Dorosh, Smith and Roy (2001). 
a Data reported here differ slightly from the data in Table 2, because this table does not include additional recall
information collected after the first round of the survey.
2,518 and 2,526 calories/person per day) (Table 2).
Calorie consumption of the poor was even more
sharply affected, falling to only 1,602 calories per
capita/day among the poorest 40 per cent of flood-
exposed households in November 1998, as
compared with about 2,230 calories per capita/day
in April 1999 and 2,193 in November 1999.
Econometric analysis suggests that had rice prices
increased even more than the 12.4 per cent increase
that actually occurred (from May–July average to
August–November average), calorie consumption
would have declined further. Without private sector
cross-border trade from India, rice prices would
likely have been at least 19 per cent higher (to a
level equal to the import parity price of rice from
Thailand) and total calorie consumption of the poor
would have fallen by an additional 44–109 calories,
to 1,529–1,596 calories/person per day (del Ninno,
Dorosh and Smith 2001). Food transfers also
contributed to increased calorie consumption,
though to a lesser extent. In the absence of these
transfers, per capita consumption would have fallen
by an additional 20–25 calories/person per day.
The flood also left a major deterioration in the
quality of households’ health environments in its
wake, damaging or destroying peoples’ homes and
toilet facilities, and reducing their access to safe
drinking water. These factors, combined with the
reduction in food consumption, led to substantial
increases in illness – even after the floodwaters had
partially or totally receded. 9.6 per cent of
individuals in the sample suffered from diarrhoea,
and 4.7 per cent were affected by respiratory illness
in the immediate post-flood period (November
1998). While adolescents faced the greatest increase
in illness, the most serious health problem posed by
the flood was illness among children (del Ninno,
Dorosh, Smith and Roy 2001). The incidence of
both wasting and stunting increased among
preschool children due to a combination of factors,
including reduced access to food, the increased
difficulties of providing proper care for children that
came with disruptions in home life, and the greater
exposure of children to contaminants.
For poor households, these adverse effects on
nutrition were not merely short-term, however. In
November 1998, 65 per cent of children in poor
flood-exposed households were stunted. This
figure actually rose to 70 per cent by April 1999,
perhaps because of a lag between a period of
deprivation and the resulting malnutrition. By
November 1999, the percentage of stunted
children in these households had fallen back to 65
per cent, the same level as 12 months earlier, while
the stunting of children in non-flood-exposed
households declined dramatically, from 57 per cent
in November 1998 to only 44 per cent one year
later (Table 2). Econometric analysis by del Ninno
and Lundberg (2001) confirms that 15 months
after the flood (November 1999), most children
appear to have regained the same nutritional status
they had a few months after the flood (November
1998). Unfortunately, those children that had a
very poor nutritional status in November 1998,
and were exposed to the flood (over 40 per cent of
the sample), had not regained the same level of
nutritional status a year later.
6 Household response and
government targeted distribution
Households adjusted to the shock of the flood in
several major ways, including reducing
expenditures, selling assets and borrowing.
Borrowing to purchase food and to fund other
expenses – such as education, health, farming,
business, repayment of loans, marriage and dowry,
purchases and mortgage of land or agricultural
equipment – was the most important coping strategy
employed by households in Bangladesh after the
flood, in terms of both the value of the resources and
the number of households who borrowed.
More than 60 per cent of poor, flood-exposed
households in the sample borrowed money in the
months immediately following the flood, and of
these more than half borrowed money for food.
Household debts rose to an average of 1.5 months
of typical consumption, compared with only a small
percentage of monthly consumption in January
1998, about 8 months before the floods (Table 3).
Households borrowed mostly from non-
institutional sources such as friends and neighbours
rather than from NGOs and banks. Interest rates on
the loans ranged from 21 per cent, from
institutional sources, to a maximum of 67 per cent.
The percentage of households with outstanding
debt one year after the flood (as reported in Table
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2) decreased progressively from November 1998,
when it peaked with 66 per cent of the households
holding an average of Taka 7,937 in outstanding
debt, to 54 per cent in November 1999 holding
Taka 6,497 each. Despite this improvement in the
number of households in debt and the amount of
their debt, it still constitutes a large share of total
expenditure and leaves those households
vulnerable to further shocks. Debts as a share of
total monthly expenditure in November 1998 were
167 per cent for the poorest 40 per cent of flood-
exposed households and 132 per cent for all
households.
In response to the flood, the government of
Bangladesh implemented two main direct transfer
relief programmes. In the initial flood period,
immediate relief through the Gratuitous Relief
programme went mainly to seriously flood-
exposed households; 35.7 per cent of severely
flood-exposed households received the transfer
compared with 9.7 per cent of non-exposed
households. Vulnerable Group Feeding transfers
started in late October and were targeted
administratively through union-level committees.
They were better targeted to the poor than to the
flood-exposed households: 38.8 per cent of the
households in the bottom quintile received grain
transfers compared to 17.2 per cent and 11.2 per
cent in the top two quintiles. Almost 20 per cent of
the non-flood exposed households received
transfers as well (del Ninno and Dorosh 2001).
However, government transfers were small relative
to the needs of households, as indicated by the
share of the transfers compared to monthly
expenditures. Small cash transfers were part of the
initial flood relief efforts, but larger cash transfers
or credit programmes were not part of the
medium-term relief to households 2–4 months
after the floods, even though foodgrain stock
constraints limited the expansion of the Vulnerable
Group Feeding programme during this period.
Eliminating borrowing following the flood would
have required a transfer of approximately Taka
5,000 (about US$100) for each of the 60 per cent
of households still in debt in December 1998.
Nationwide, total private borrowing by households
may have reached US$1.0–1.5 billion, equivalent
to 15–20 per cent of total government
expenditures in 1998/9, compared with about
US$0.6 billion of annual loan disbursement by
Grameen and BRAC put together.
7 Conclusions
The studies summarised in this article have shown
that well-functioning private markets, suitable
government policies, and interventions by
government and non-governmental organisations
worked together with effective private coping
strategies to prevent a major food-related disaster
after the 1998 flood in Bangladesh.
The aftermath of the 1998 flood stands in sharp
contrast to 1974, when thin private markets, poor
infrastructure, inadequate government stocks,
limited public food distribution in rural areas, and
foreign exchange shortages contributed to extreme
price increases and famine. Subsequent to 1974,
Bangladesh successfully managed major flood-related
production shortfalls in 1984 and 1988, through
large-scale, mostly untargeted, public foodgrain
distribution supplied mainly from government
stocks. Major changes in food markets and the
overall economic environment suggest, however, that
large public stocks are not required to avert famines
in Bangladesh. Instead, greater reliance on markets is
a viable policy option because of long-term
investments in rural infrastructure, and agricultural
research and extension that have augmented
domestic foodgrain production, reduced seasonality
of supply (through increases in winter season boro
and wheat crops) and contributed to more efficient
domestic rice markets. Moreover, trade liberalisation,
greater availability of foreign exchange, and deeper
international markets for rice and other grains have
made it possible for private sector imports to add
rapidly to domestic supplies in times of shortage.
The country’s trade liberalisation of the early 1990s
made possible the large-scale private sector rice
imports following the flood, adding more than 2
million metric tons to Bangladesh’s rice supply,
stabilising rice prices and preventing a further
serious decline in calorie consumption of the poor.
Government public foodgrain distribution was well-
targeted to poor and flood-exposed households,
improving household food security and helping to
offset some of the adverse effects of the flood by
(marginally) increasing calorie consumption.
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Although a major food crisis was averted in 1998,
the poor did suffer, both in the short term through
reduced consumption and increased illness, and in
the medium term through increases in household
debt and lingering nutritional consequences. The
major coping strategy of households in the first three
months after the flood was to borrow from private
sources. Over time, however, this reliance on private
sector borrowing had adverse implications for food
security and economic growth. Fifteen months after
the flood, the country’s poorest households still
laboured under high levels of debt.
Thus, the experience of the 1998 Bangladesh flood
illustrates the crucial role that private markets and
appropriate government investments and policies
can play in maintaining food availability, limiting
price increases and supplementing household
access to food. Additional policy measures could
further mitigate the negative impact of natural
disasters, including (1) agricultural and investment
policies to increase agricultural productivity and
rural incomes, (2) investments in infrastructure to
help maintain efficient and competitive foodgrain
markets, (3) policies and programmes to reduce
chronic malnutrition among children and thereby
soften the negative impact of natural shocks, and
(4) targeted cash transfers and credit programmes
to disaster-affected households, to enable them to
avoid long-term debt.
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1. See del Ninno, Dorosh, Smith and Roy (2001); del
Ninno, Roy and Mukherjee (2001); del Ninno and
Dorosh (2001); Dorosh (2001) and del Ninno,
Dorosh and Smith (2001).
2. The figures given are official statistics from the
Bangladesh government. Calculations of implicit
food demand and Indian export data suggest that the
actual quantity of imports may have been as much as
1.0 million tons lower (Dorosh 2001).
3. The official death toll from the 1974 famine was
30,000 (Alamgir 1980); unofficial reports cited in
Sobhan (1979: 175) were as high as 100,000.
4. Wheat prices also rose by 61.2 per cent in the same
period.
5. See also Islam (1997) for a further discussion of the
1974 famine.
6. Ravallion (1985, 1990) provides econometric
evidence that exaggerated reports of crop failure
influenced traders’ expectations and led to ‘excessive
hoarding’ of stocks.
7. Private and public stocks were already low because
of consecutive bad harvests in the preceding years, in
part caused by the dislocation of production and
trade during the 1971 war. Public stocks declined
from an average of more than 300,000 tons in
1972/73 to between 140,000 and 172,000 tons
during January–April 1974.
8. Foreign exchange reserves during the first and third
quarters of 1974 were only one half and one quarter
of what they were during the corresponding periods
in 1973.
9. Requests for 250,000 tons of food aid in mid-1973
and an additional 400,000 tons in mid-1974 were
delayed mainly because of jute exports by
Bangladesh to Cuba, which violated US conditions
for aid. No US food aid arrived until November
1974, by which time the worst days of famine were
over (see Sobhan 1979).
10. In spite of vast improvements in the quality and
timeliness of information on markets and production
since 1974 (and 1984), further development of an
early warning system for production shortfalls is
warranted.
11. Note also that in 1974/5, most of the distribution
took place in early 1975, after the 1974 aman
harvest, when the famine was over.
12. Discouraging private speculation was a major
Ministry of Food rationale for maintaining a
relatively high level of stocks during these crucial
months in 1998/9. Early assurances of food aid by
donors may also have contributed to calming
markets in Bangladesh.
13. The record 1.91 million ton wheat harvest in March
and April 1999 also added to food availability soon
after the aman crop shortfall.
14. In addition, replacement of flood-susceptible
deepwater aman cultivation by irrigated boro
cultivation in cropping patterns has reduced the
production risk associated with floods (Hossain,
Bose and Chowdhury 2001).
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